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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jose Tapia-Lopez timely appeals from the district court's order revoking 
probation. On appeal, Mr. Tapia-Lopez argues that the Idaho Supreme Court denied 
him due process and equal protection when it refused to augment the record with 
various transcripts he requested to be created at the public's expense. Additionally, 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez argues that the district court abused its discretion when denied his oral 
Rule 35 motion requesting leniency. 
Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez was charged, by Information, with two counts of delivery of a 
controlled substance. (R., pp.18-19.) Pursuant to a plea agreement, Mr. Tapia-Lopez 
pleaded guilty to possession. (R., pp.43-44, 60.) It appears from the record that the 
State agreed to dismiss the remaining charge. (R., pp.43-44, 66-67.) 1 Thereafter, the 
district court imposed a unified sentence of twelve years, with three years fixed, and 
retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.60-63.) Upon review of Mr. Tapia-Lopez's period of 
retained jurisdiction (hereinafter ''rider"), the district court suspended the sentence and 
placed him on probation. (R., pp.73-75.) 
After a period of probation, the State filed a report of probation violation and a 
motion to revoke, alleging that Mr. Tapia-Lopez violated the terms of his probation. 
1 The actual terms of the plea agreement are not in the record. Mr. Tapia-Lopez 
anticipated this type of problem and filed a motion to augment the record with various 
transcripts, including, the transcript of the June 28, 2010, change of plea hearing. 
(Motion to Augment and Suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter, Motion to 
Augment), pp.1-4.) However, the Supreme Court denied that request (Order Denying 
Motion to Augment and to Suspend the Briefing Schedule (hereinafter; Order Denying 
Motion to Augment), p.1.) 
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(R., pp.81-84.) Mr. Tapia-Lopez admitted to violating the terms of his probation for 
returning to the United States from Mexico and not reporting to his probation officer. 
(Tr., p.5, L.24 - p.6, L.8.) At the probation violation admission/disposition hearing, 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez requested a sentence reduction. (Tr., p.7, Ls.13-21.) The district court 
then revoked probation and executed the underlying sentence, without reduction. 
(R., pp.106-107.) Mr. Tapia-Lopez timely appealed. (R., pp.109-111.) 
On appeal, Mr. Tapia-Lopez filed a motion to augment the record with various 
transcripts. (Motion to Augment, pp.1-4.) The State objected to Mr. Tapia-Lopez's 
request for the transcripts. (Objection to "Motion to Augment and to Suspend the 
Briefing Schedule and Statement in Support Thereof" (hereinafter, Objection to Motion 
to Augment), pp.1-4.) Thereafter, the Idaho Supreme Court entered an order denying 
his request for transcripts of the change of plea hearing, held on June 28, 2010, the 
sentencing hearing, held on August 11, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on 
January 10, 2011. (Order Denying Motion to Augment, pp.1-2.) 
2 
ISSUES 
1. Did the Idaho Supreme Court deny Mr. Tapia-Lopez due process and equal 
protection when it denied his Motion to Augment with the requested transcripts? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez's oral 
Rule 35 motion requesting leniency? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez Due Process And Equal Protection 
When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With Necessary 
Transcripts 
A. Introduction 
A long line of United States Supreme Court cases hold that it is a violation of the 
Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal protection clauses to deny an indigent 
defendant access to transcripts of proceedings which are relevant to issues the 
defendant intends to raise on appeal. In the event the record reflects a colorable need 
for a transcript, the only way a court can constitutionally preclude an indigent defendant 
from obtaining that transcript is if the State can prove that the transcript is irrelevant to 
the issues raised on appeal. 
In this case, Mr. Tapia-Lopez filed a Motion to Augment, requesting transcripts of 
the change of plea hearing, held on June 28, 2010, the sentencing hearing, held on 
August 11, 2010, and the rider review hearing held on January 10, 2011, that request 
was denied by the Supreme Court. On appeal, Mr. Tapia-Lopez is challenging the 
Idaho Supreme Court's denial of his request for the transcripts. Mr. Tapia-Lopez 
asserts that the requested transcripts are relevant to the issue of whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez's oral Rule 35 motion 
because the applicable standard of review requires an appellate court to conduct an 
independent review of the entirety of the proceedings in order to evaluate the district 
court's sentencing/probationary decisions. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court erred in 
denying his request. 
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B. The Idaho Supreme Court Denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez Due Process And Equal 
Protection When It Denied His Motion To Augment The Appellate Record With 
The I\Jecessary Transcripts 
1. The Idaho Supreme Court1 By Failing To Provide Mr. Tapia-Lopez With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process And 
Equal Protection Because He Cannot Obtain A Merit Based Appellate 
Review Of His Sentencing Claims 
The constitutions of both the United States and the State of Idaho guarantee a 
criminal defendant due process of law. See U.S. Const. amend. XIV; Idaho Const 
art. I §13. 
It is firmly established that due process requires notice and a meaningful 
opportunity to be heard. Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545 (1965}; 
Cole v. Arkansas, 333 U. 196 (1948). The Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment also protects against arbitrary and capricious acts 
of the government. Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980). Due 
process requires that judicial proceedings be "fundamentally fair." 
Lassiter v. Department of Soc. Serv. of Durham Cty., 452 U.S. 18, 24 
(1981). Const. 
State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,445 (1991) (overruled on other grounds by State v. Wood, 
132 Idaho 88 (1998)). The Idaho Supreme Court has "applied the United States 
Supreme Court's standard for interpreting the due process clause of the United States 
Constitution to art. I, Section 13 of the Idaho Constitution." Maresh v. State, Dept. of 
Health and Welfare ex rel. Caballero, 132 Idaho 221,227 (1998). 
In Idaho, a criminal defendant's right to appeal is created by statute. 
See LC. § 19-2801. Idaho statutes dictate that if an indigent defendant requests a 
transcript, the transcript must be created at county expense. I.C. § 1-1105(2); I.C. § 19-
863(a). Idaho court rules also address this issue. Idaho Criminal Rule 5.2 mandates 
the production of transcripts when requested by an indigent defendant. I.C.R. 5.2(a). 
Further, "[t]ranscripts may be requested of any hearing or proceeding before the court .. 
. . " Id. Idaho Criminal Rule 54.7 further enables a district court to "order a transcript to 
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be prepared at county expense if the appellant is exempt from paying such a fee as 
provided by statute or law." I.C.R. 54.?(a). 
An appeal from an order revoking probation is an appeal of right as defined in 
Idaho Appellate Rule 11. An order revoking probation is an order "made after judgment 
affecting the substantial rights of the defendant." State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852 
(Ct. App. 1983). Additionally, an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35 motion is an 
appeal of right as defined in Idaho Appellate Rule 11 (9). See State v. Fuller, 104 Idaho 
891 (Ct. App. 1983) (an order denying a motion for reduction of sentence under a Rule 
35 is an appealable order pursuant to I.A.R. 11 (c)(6)). 
The United States Supreme Court has issued a long line of cases that directly 
address whether indigent defendants, who have a statutory right to an appeal, can 
require the state to pay for an appellate record including verbatim transcripts of the 
relevant trial proceedings. There are two fundamental themes which permeate these 
cases. The first theme is that the Fourteenth Amendment's due process and equal 
protection clauses are interpreted broadly. Any disparate treatment between indigent 
defendants and those with financial means is not tolerated. However, the second 
theme limits the states' obligation to provide indigent defendants with a record for 
review. The states do not have to provide indigent defendants with everything they 
request. In order to meet the constitutional mandates of due process and equal 
protection, the states must provide indigent defendants with an appellate record unless 
some or all of the requested materials are unnecessary or frivolous. 
The seminal opinion in this line of cases is Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956). 
In that case, two indigent defendants "filed a motion in the trial court asking that a 
certified copy of the entire record, including a stenographic transcript of the 
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proceedings, be furnished [to] them without cost." Griffin, 351 at 13. At that time, the 
State of Illinois provided free transcripts for indigent defendants that had been 
sentenced to death, but required defendants in all other criminal cases to purchase 
transcripts themselves. Id. at 14. The sole question before the United States Supreme 
Court was whether the denial of the requested transcripts to indigent non-death penalty 
defendants was a denial of due process or equal protection. Id. at 16. 
The Supreme Court initially noted that "[p]roviding equal justice for poor and rich, 
weak and powerful alike is an age old problem." Id. "Both equal protection and due 
process emphasize the central aim of our entire judicial system-all people charged with 
crime must, so far as the law is concerned, 'stand on an equality before the bar of 
justice in every American court."' Id. at 17 (quoting Chambers v. Florida, 309 U.S. 227, 
241 (1940)). "In criminal trials a State can no more discriminate on account of poverty 
than on account of religion, race, or color." Id. The Supreme Court went on to hold as 
follows: 
There is no meaningful distinction between a rule which would deny the 
poor the right to defend themselves in a trial court and one which 
effectively denies the poor an adequate appellate review accorded to all 
who have money enough to pay the costs in advance. It is true that a 
State is not required by the Federal Constitution to provide appellate 
courts or a right to appellate review at all. But that is not to say that a 
State that does grant appellate review can do so in a way that 
discriminates against some convicted defendants on account of their 
poverty. Appellate review has now become an integral part of the Illinois 
trial system for finally adjudicating the guilt or innocence of a defendant. 
Consequently at all stages of the proceedings the Due Process and Equal 
Protection Clauses protect persons like petitioners from invidious 
discriminations. 
Id. at 18 (citations and footnotes omitted). In order to satisfy the constitutional 
mandates of both due process and equal protection, an indigent defendant must be 
provided with a record which facilitates an effective merits-related appellate review. At 
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the same time, the Supreme Court noted that a stenographic transcript is not necessary 
in instances where a less expensive, yet adequate, alternative exists. Id. at 20. 
In Burns v. Ohio, 360 U.S. 252 (1959), the Supreme Court reaffirmed its holding 
in Griffin when it struck down a requirement that all appeals to the Ohio Supreme Court 
be accompanied with a requisite filing fee, regardless of a defendant's indigency. In 
that case, the State argued that the defendant had already received appellate review of 
his conviction by the Ohio appellate court. Burns, 360 U.S. at 257. The United States 
Supreme Court rejected this argument and ruled that "once the State chooses to 
establish appellate review in criminal cases, it may not foreclose indigents from access 
to any phase of that procedure because of their poverty." Id. 'This principle is no less 
applicable where the State has afforded an indigent defendant access to the first phase 
of its appellate procedure but has effectively foreclosed access to the second phase of 
that procedure solely because of his indigency." Id. 
In State v. Draper, 372 U.S. 487 (1963), the Supreme Court addressed a 
procedure determining access to transcripts based on a frivolousness standard. "Under 
the present standard, ... they must convince the trial judge that their contentions of 
error have merit before they can obtain the free transcript necessary to prosecute their 
appeal." Draper, 372 U.S. 494. The Supreme Court first expanded upon its statement 
in Griffin, that a stenographic transcript is not required if an equivalent alternative is 
available, by adding a relevancy requirement when stating that "part or all of the 
stenographic transcript in certain cases will not be germane to consideration of the 
appeal, and a State will not be required to expend its funds unnecessarily in such 
circumstances." Id. at 495. The Court went on to discuss the specific issues raised for 
appeal by the defendants to decide the relevance of the requested transcripts. The 
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Court ultimately concluded that the issues raised by the defendants could not be 
adequately reviewed without resorting to the stenographic transcripts of the trial 
proceedings. Id. at 497-99. 
Mayer v. City of Chicago, 404 U.S. 189 (1971 ), extended the Griffin protections 
to defendants convicted of non-felony offenses, and placed the burden on the State to 
prove that the requests for verbatim transcripts are not relevant to the issues raised on 
appeal. In doing so, it was held that a defendant need only make a colorable argument 
that he/she needs items to create a complete record on appeal. Id. at 195. If the State 
wants to deny the defendant's request, it is the State's burden to prove that the 
requested items are not necessary for the appeal. Id. 
This authority has been recognized by both the Idaho Supreme Court and the 
Idaho Court of Appeals. See Gardener v. State, 91 Idaho 909 (1967); State v. 
Callaghan, 143 Idaho 856 (Ct. App. 2006); State v. Braaten, 144 Idaho 60 (Ct. App. 
2007). 
An application of the foregoing rules to the facts of this case creates a situation 
analogous to Lane v. Brown, 372 U.S. 477 (1863). In that case, a transcript was 
necessary to perfect an appeal and the appeal could be dismissed without the 
transcript. Lane, 327 U.S. at 478-81. Similarly, in Idaho, an appellant must provide an 
adequate record or face procedural default. "It is well established that an appellant 
bears the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can 
review the merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record 
are missing on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court." 
State v. Coma, 133 Idaho 29, 34 (Ct. App. 1999) (citing State v. Beck, 128 Idaho 416, 
422 (Ct. App. 1996); State v. Beason, 119 Idaho 103, 105 (Ct. App. 1991 ); State v. 
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Murinko, 108 Idaho 872, 873 (Ct. App. 1985); State v. Repici, 122 Idaho 538, 541 
(Ct. App. 1992)). If the transcripts are missing, but the record contains court minutes, 
that may be sufficient so that a "meaningful review of [an appellant's] claim is possible, 
although the Idaho Court of Appeals has "strongly suggest(ed] that appellate counsel 
not rely on the district court minutes to provide an adequate record for [that] Court's 
review." State v. Murphy, 133 Idaho 489, 491 (Ct. App. 1999). If Mr. Tapia-Lopez fails 
to provide the appellate court with the requested items, the legal presumption will apply 
and Mr. Tapia-Lopez's claims will not be addressed on their actual merits. If it is state 
action alone, which prevents him from access to the requested items, then such action 
is a violation of due process, as per Lane, and any such presumption should no longer 
apply. 
Whether the transcripts of the requested proceedings were before the district 
court at the time of the probation revocation hearing is not relevant in deciding whether 
the transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal because, in reaching a sentencing 
decision, a district court is not limited to considering only that information offered at the 
hearing from which the appeal is filed. Rather, a court is entitled to utilize knowledge 
gained from its own official position and observations. Downing v. State, 136 Idaho 
367, 373-74 (Ct. App. 2001); see also State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 907 (1983) 
(recognizing that the findings of the trial judge in sentencing are based, in part, upon 
what the court heard during the trial); State v. Wal/ace, 98 Idaho 318 (1977) 
(recognizing that the court could rely upon "the number of certain types of criminal 
transactions that [the judge] has observed in the courts within his judicial district and the 
quantity of drugs therein involved"); State v. Gibson, 106 Idaho 491 (Ct. App. 1984) 
(approving sentencing court's reliance upon evidence presented at the preliminary 
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hearing from a previously dismissed case because "the judge hardly could be expected 
to disregard what he already knew about Gibson from the other case"). Thus, whether 
the prior hearings were transcribed or not is irrelevant, because the court may rely upon 
the information it already knows from presiding over the prior hearings when it made the 
decision to revoke probation. 
The Idaho Court of Appeals has recently issued an opinion in State v. Morgan, 
Docket No 39057, 2012 Opinion No 38 (Ct. App. 2012), which addressed the foregoing 
argument. In that case, the defendant pleaded guilty and was placed on probation. Id. 
at 1. After a period of probation, the defendant admitted to violating the terms of his 
probation and the district court revoked probation but retained jurisdiction. Id. at 1-2. 
After he completed his rider, the district court placed the defendant on probation. Id. at 
2. The defendant admitted to violating the terms of his probation and the district court 
revoked probation. Id. The defendant appealed from the district court's second order 
revoking probation. Id. 
On appeal, the defendant filed a motion to augment the appellate record with 
transcripts associated with his first probation violation and disposition, which was denied 
by the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. The defendant then raised as issues on appeal the 
question of whether the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due process and equal 
protection when it denied the motion to augment and the issue of whether the district 
court abused its discretion when it revoked probation. Id. at 2-3. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals held that the transcripts of the prior probation proceedings were not necessary 
for the appeal because "they were not before the district court in the second probation 
violation proceedings, and the district court gave no indication that it based its 
revocation decision upon anything that occurred during those proceedings." Id. at 4. 
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While Morgan does directly deal with the issues raised in this appeal, it is 
distinguishable because Mr. Tapia-Lopez is challenging not only the order revoking 
probation, but also the length of his sentence, which entails an analysis of the district 
court's sentencing rationale.2 
2 Another issue with Morgan is that it invites appellate counsel, in the event an appeal is 
assigned to the Court of Appeals, to file motions directly with the Court of Appeals which 
is not allowed under the Idaho Appellate Rules. In Morgan, the Court of Appeals 
refused to address Mr. Morgan's claim that the Idaho Supreme Court denied him due 
process because it does not have the power to overrule a decision by the Idaho 
Supreme Court. Id. at 3. The Morgan Court went on to state that it would have the 
authority to review a renewed motion to augment if it was filed with the Court of Appeals 
after the appeal was assigned to the Court of Appeals and contained information or 
argument which was not presented to the Idaho Supreme Court. Id. However, this 
position is untenable because the Idaho Appellate Rules require all motions to be filed 
directly with the Idaho Supreme Court. For example, Idaho Appellate Rule 110 states 
as follows: 
All motions, petitions, briefs and other appellate documents, other than the 
initial notice of appeal, shall be filed with the Clerk of the Supreme Court 
as required by the Idaho Appellate Rules with the court heading of the 
Supreme Court of the State of Idaho as provided by Rule 6. There shall 
be no separate filings directed to or filed with the Court of Appeals. In the 
event of an assignment of a case to the Court of Appeals, the title of the 
proceeding and the identifying number thereof shall not be changed 
except that the Clerk of the Supreme Court may add additional letters or 
other notations to the case number so as to identify the assignment of the 
case. All case files shall be maintained in the office of the Clerk of the 
Supreme Court. 
(emphasis added). Furthermore, Idaho Appellate Rule 30 requires that all motions to 
augment be filed with the Supreme Court. The relevant portions of I.AR 30 follow: 
Any party may move the Supreme Court to augment or delete from the 
settled reporter's transcript or clerk's or agency's record. 
Unless otherwise expressly ordered by the Supreme Court such motion 
shall be determined without oral argument. The reporter's transcript and 
clerk's or agency's record may also be augmented or portions deleted by 
stipulation of the parties and order of the Supreme Court. 
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Additionally, the requested items are within an Idaho appellate court's scope of 
review. The requested transcripts are relevant because Idaho appellate courts review 
all proceedings following sentencing when determining whether the court made 
appropriate sentencing determinations. "Where an appeal is taken from an order 
refusing to reduce a sentence under Rule 35 [the appellate court's] scope of review 
includes all information submitted at the original sentencing hearing and at the 
subsequent hearing held on the motion to reduce." State v. Arazia, 109 Idaho 188, 189 
(Ct. App. 1985) ( citing State v. Yarbrough, 106 Idaho 545 (Ct. App. 1984 )) (emphasis 
added). This is because in order to determine whether new information is presented 
pursuant to Rule 35, the reviewing court must first know what was presented at 
sentencing. See also State v. Hanington, 148 Idaho 26, 28 (Ct. App. 2009) ("When we 
review a sentence that is ordered into execution following a period of probation, we will 
examine the entire record encompassing events before and after the original judgment. 
We base our review upon the facts existing when the sentence was imposed as well as 
events occurring between the original sentencing and the revocation of probation." 
(emphasis added)). 3 In other words, an appellate court reviewing a district court's 
(emphasis added). Mr. Tapia-Lopez is not aware of any court rule which allows a party 
to an appeal to file a motion directly with the Court of Appeals. Idaho Appellate Rule 
110 expressly prohibits such filings. Therefore, the Morgan Court's statement that 
Mr. Morgan could have filed a renewed motion to augment directly with the Court of 
Appeals is contrary to the Idaho Appellate Rules. 
3 In Morgan, supra, the Court of Appeals clarified the scope of review articulated in 
Hanington. Specifically it held: 
In reviewing the propriety of a probation revocation, we will not arbitrarily 
confine ourselves to only those facts which arise after sentencing to the 
time of the revocation of probation. However, that does not mean that a// 
proceedings in the trial court up to and including sentencing are germane. 
The focus of the inquiry is the conduct underlying the trial court's decision 
to revoke probation. Thus, this Court will consider the elements of the 
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sentencing/probationary decision conducts an independent review of the entire record 
to determine if the record supports the district court's decisions. This standard of review 
is necessary in Idaho because judges are not required to state their 
sentencing/probationary rationale on the record. State v. Nield, 106 Idaho 665, 666 
(1984). 
Further support for Mr. Tapia-Lopez's position can be found in State v. Warren, 
123 Idaho 20 (Ct. App.1992). In that case, Mr. Warren was convicted of aggravated 
battery in 1988 and placed on probation. Id. at 21. IVlr. Warren's probation was then 
revoked and the district court retained jurisdiction for 180 days. Id. After completing the 
period of retained jurisdiction, Mr. Warren was placed on another period of probation, 
which was ultimately revoked. Id. The district court then sua sponte reduced the length 
of Mr. Warren's sentence. Id. Mr. Warren then appealed and alleged that the district 
court should have further reduced the length of his sentence. Id. In support of that 
position, Mr. Warren argued that his probation violation was trivial. Id. The Court of 
Appeals addressed that argument stating "Warren incorrectly points to the nature of the 
probation violation by arguing that his violation was trivial. This Court must look at the 
nature of the original criminal offense, in this case aggravated battery where Warren bit 
off his victim's ear." Id. However, the Court of Appeals did not address the merits of his 
sentence reduction claim because IVlr. Warren had failed to provide a copy of the 
original Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) and a transcript of the 
original sentencing hearing. Id. Even though IVlr. Warren did not appeal from the 
record before the trial court relevant to the revocation of probation issues 
which are properly made part of the record on appeal. 
Morgan, at 4. (original emphasis). As stated above, Morgan is distinguishable as 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez is raising a sentencing claim in this appeal. 
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original sentence, and the original sentencing hearing occurred years before the 
decision at issue, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the transcript of that hearing was 
necessary to address Mr. Warren's claims of error. Moreover, there was no indication 
that a transcript of that hearing was created before the probation violation hearing or 
that the district court referenced the original sentencing hearing at the probation 
violation disposition hearing. It appears that the Court of Appeals assumed that the 
original sentencing hearing would address the nature of the original offense. 
Had Mr. Tapia-Lopez failed to request the transcripts at issue, the Warren 
opinion indicates that the merits of his sentencing issues would not be addressed on 
appeal. See also Coma, 133 Idaho at 34 ("It is well established that an appellant bears 
the burden to provide an adequate record upon which the appellate court can review the 
merits of the claims of error, ... and where pertinent portions of the record are missing 
on appeal, they are presumed to support the actions of the trial court."); State v. Rundle, 
107 Idaho 936, 937 (Ct. App. 1984) ("When a discretionary decision related to 
sentencing is challenged on appeal, the appellant bears the burden of presenting a 
sufficient record to evaluate the merits of the challenge."). 
In sum, there is a long line of cases which repeatedly hold it is a violation of both 
due process and equal protection to deny indigent defendants transcripts of trial 
proceedings on appeal. The requested transcripts are relevant to the issues on appeal 
because the applicable standard of review requires the appellate court to conduct an 
impendent review of all of the proceedings before the district court. Under this standard 
of review, the focus is not on the district court's express sentencing rationale, 4 to the 
4 However, an abuse of discretion might be found if the district court employs a 
particularly unreasonable or absurd sentencing/probationary analysis. Even under 
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contrary, the question on appeal is if the record itself supports the district court's 
ultimate sentencing/probationary decisions. As such, the decision to deny Mr. Tapia-
Lopez's request for the transcripts will render his appeal meaningless because it will be 
presumed that the missing transcripts support the district court's sentencing decisions. 
This functions as a procedural bar to the review of Mr. Tapia-Lopez's appellate 
sentencing claims on the merits and, therefore, Mr. Tapia-Lopez should either be 
provided with the requested transcripts or the presumption should not be applied. 
2. The Idaho Supreme Court, By Failing To Provide Mr. Tapia-Lopez With 
Access To The Requested Transcripts, Has Denied Him Due Process 
Because He Cannot Obtain Effective Assistance Of Counsel On Appeal 
In Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. (1932), the Sixth Amendment right to counsel 
in the context of death penalty cases was selectively incorporated to the states through 
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States 
Constitution. In coming to this conclusion, the United State Supreme Court reasoned 
that the ability to be heard by counsel is so inextricably related to due process that the 
denial of counsel is tantamount to the denial of a hearing. Powell, 287 U.S. at 69. The 
Supreme Court also stated that under the facts of Powell "the necessity of counsel was 
so vital and imperative that the failure to make an effective appointment of counsel was 
likewise a denial of due process within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment ... 
[to] hold otherwise would be to ignore the fundamental postulate, already adverted to, 
'that there are certain immutable principles of justice which inhere in the very idea of 
free government which no member of the Union may disregard."' Id. at 71-72. 
those circumstances, the appellate court will still employ an independent review of the 
record to determine if the ultimate decision is sound despite the unreasonable analysis. 
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In Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), the United States Supreme Court 
relied on Griffin, supra, and its progeny and determined that the Equal Protection 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires the states to provide indigent defendants 
the right to counsel on appeal. In Evitts v. Lucey, 469 U.S. 387 (1985), the protection of 
Douglas was extended to the right to effective assistance of counsel on appeal. 
According to the United States Supreme Court: 
In short, the promise of Douglas that a criminal defendant has a right to 
counsel on appeal-like the promise of Gideon that a criminal defendant 
has a right to counsel at trial would be a futile gesture unless it 
comprehended the right to effective assistance of counsel. 
Evitts, 469 U.S. at 397. 
The remaining issue is defining effective assistance of counsel. According to the 
United States Supreme Court, appellate counsel must make a conscientious 
examination of the case and file a brief in support of the best arguments to be made. 
Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), held that the constitutional requirements 
of substantial equality and fair process "can only be attained where counsel acts as an 
active advocate on behalf of his client .... [Counsel's] role as advocate requires that he 
support his client's appeal to the best of his ability." See also Banuelos v. State, 127 
Idaho 860, 865 (Ct. App. 1995). In this case, the lack of access to the requested 
transcripts prevented appellate counsel from making a conscientious examination of the 
case and has potentially prevented appellate counsel from determining whether there is 
an additional issue to raise, or whether there is a factual support either in favor of any 
argument made or undercutting an argument. Therefore, Mr. Tapia-Lopez has not 
obtained review of the court proceedings based on the merits and was not provided with 
effective assistance of counsel in that endeavor. 
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Furthermore, in State v. Charboneau, 116 Idaho 129, 137 (1989) (overruled on 
other grounds by State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425 (1991 )), the Idaho Supreme Court held 
that the starting point for evaluating whether counsel renders effective assistance of 
counsel in a criminal action is the American Bar Association, Standards For Criminal 
Justice, The Defense Function. These standards offer insight into the role and 
responsibilities of appellate counsel. Regarding appellate counsel, the standards state: 
Appellate counsel should give a client his or her best professional 
evaluation of the questions that might be presented on appeal. Counsel, 
when inquiring into the case, should consider all issues that might affect 
the validity of the judgment of conviction and sentence . . . . Counsel 
should advise on the probable outcome of a challenge to the conviction or 
sentence. Counsel should endeavor to persuade the client to abandon a 
wholly frivolous appeal or to eliminate contentions lacking in substance. 
Standard 4-8.3(b). In the absence of access to the requested transcripts, appellate 
counsel can neither make a professional evaluation of the questions that might be 
presented on appeal, nor consider all issues that might have affected the district court's 
decision to deny his oral Rule 35 motion. Further, counsel is unable to advise 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez on the probable role the transcripts may play in the appeal. 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez is entitled to effective assistance of counsel in this appeal, and 
effective assistance cannot be given in the absence of access to the relevant 
transcripts. Therefore, the Idaho Supreme Court has denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez his 
constitutional right to due process which includes a right to the effective assistance of 
counsel in this appeal. Accordingly, appellate counsel should be provided with access 
to the requested transcripts and should be allowed the opportunity to provide any 
necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which arise as a result of that review. 
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11. 
The District Court Abused Its Discretion When It Denied Mr. Tapia-Lopez's Oral Rule 35 
Motion Requesting Leniency 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez argues that the unified sentence of twelve years, with three 
years fixed, is unduly harsh when it is viewed in light of the mitigating factors present in 
this matter. A motion to alter an otherwise lawful sentence under Rule 35 is addressed 
to the sound discretion of the sentencing court, and essentially is a plea for leniency 
which may be granted if the sentence originally imposed was unduly severe. State v. 
Trent, 125 Idaho 251, 253 (Ct. App. 1994). "The criteria for examining rulings denying 
the requested leniency are the same as those applied in determining whether the 
original sentence was reasonable." Id. 
Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed an excessively 
harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the record 
giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the 
protection of the public interest. See State v. Reinke, 103 Idaho 771 (Ct. App. 1982). 
The Idaho Supreme Court has held that, "'[w]here a sentence is within statutory limits, 
an appellant has the burden of showing a clear abuse of discretion on the part of the 
court imposing the sentence."' State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho 293, 294 (1997) (quoting 
State v. Cotton, 100 Idaho 573, 577 (1979)). Mr. Tapia-Lopez does not allege that his 
sentence exceeds the statutory maximum. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of 
discretion, Mr. Tapia-Lopez must show that in light of the governing criteria, the 
sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. Id. The governing criteria or 
objectives of criminal punishment are: (1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the 
individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) 
punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. 
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"Where an appeal is taken from an order refusing to reduce a sentence under 
Rule 35, [the appellate court's] scope of review includes all information submitted at the 
original sentencing hearing and at the subsequent hearing held on the motion to 
reduce." Arazia, 109 Idaho at 189. 
There are various mitigating factors present in this matter which support the 
conclusion that Mr. Tapia-Lopez's sentence is excessive. Specifically, Mr. Tapia-Lopez 
argues that his deportation status is a mitigating factor. The Idaho Court of Appeals has 
noted that deportation or removal is an appropriate consideration for a trial court in 
fashioning a sentence and it is an abuse of discretion to omit this as a sentencing 
consideration. State v. Tinoco-Perez, 145 Idaho 400, 402 (Ct. App. 2008).5 In fact, "for 
many non-citizens, any term of imprisonment imposed by the court will be quite 
secondary to the immigration consequences in impact on the defendant's life and 
future." Id. Mr. Tapia-Lopez is a citizen of Mexico and there are deportation 
implications associated with the underlying offense. (PSI, pp.2, 4.) 
The harshness of the deportation is exacerbated because of his significant family 
ties in the United States. (PSI, pp.4-6.) Mr. Tapia-Lopez's father died from a heart 
attack when Mr. Tapia-Lopez was only three years old. (PSI, p.4.) Mr. Tapia-Lopez 
does have a good relationship with his mother. (PSI, p.4.) He has also been married 
since 1998 and is raising two daughters. (PSI, p.4.) 
Additionally, the nature of the offense is a mitigating factor. Mr. Tapia-Lopez was 
a passenger in a car and the driver was driving at excessive speeds to avoid arrest. 
5 
"Although the risk of deportation or other impact on immigration status is generally 
considered a 'collateral consequence' of a criminal conviction, Retamoza v. State, 125 
Idaho 792, 796-97 (Ct. App. 1994), it nevertheless is often a very significant 
consequence for the defendant." Id. 
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(PSI, pp.1-2.) Mr. Tapia-Lopez talked the driver of the vehicle to pull over. (PSI, p.2.) 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez talked the driver into pulling over the car even though there was risk 
that he could be arrested for a controlled substances related offense. This evinces a 
concern about the safety of society. 
Additionally, Mr. Tapia-Lopez's substance addiction is a mitigating factor. 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez was determined to suffer from substance addiction. (GAIN-I 
Recommendation and Referral Summary (hereinafter, GRRS), attached to the PSI, p.1.) 
It appears he suffers from alcohol abuse and amphetamine dependence. (GRRS, p.1.) 
However, his addictions did not appear to be very severe at the time of sentencing as 
he was only recommended for Level I out-patient treatment. (GRRS, p.9.) 
Further, Mr. Tapia-Lopez's work ethic is a mitigating factor. Mr. Tapia-Lopez was 
raised with a strong work ethic. (PSI, p.4.) In fact, Mr. Tapia-Lopez maintained 
employed with the same employer for approximately five years. (PSI, p.6.) 
Finally, Mr. Tapia-Lopez's positive performance while on his rider is a mitigating 
factor. The disciplinary summary in Mr. Tapia-Lopez's Addendum to the Presentence 
Investigation Report (hereinafter, APSI) stated that he "demonstrated responsible and 
mature behavior." (APSI, p.2.) It went on to note that his "self-discipline and rule 
abiding behavior is indicative of being amenable to treatment and supervision in the 
community." (APIS, p.2.) Mr. Tapia-Lopez received a glowing summary of his 
participation in the New Direction Program. (APSI, p.2.) For example, it stated that he 
had a "great attitude" and compensated for his language barrier with hard work and an 
ability to accept feedback. (APSI, p.2.) He displayed both his work ethic and respect 
for others in his English course. (APSI, p.3.) He managed to complete his career 
planning class despite the fact he cannot read or write either English or Spanish. 
21 
(APSI, p.3.) Mr. Tapia-Lopez reached the highest level of the Individual Accounting 
Model program and completed fifty-five hours of community service. (APSI, p.3.) 
In sum, there are various mitigating factors which support the conclusion that 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez's sentence is excessively harsh. 
CONCLUSION 
Mr. Tapia-Lopez respectfully requests access to the requested transcripts and 
the opportunity to provide any necessary supplemental briefing raising issues which 
arise as a result of that review. In the event this request is denied, Mr. Tapia Lopez 
respectfully requests that this Court reduce the fixed portion of his sentence. 
Alternatively, Mr. Tapia Lopez requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems 
appropriate. 
DATED this yth day of January, 2013. 
---------7 /~ ,/ j 
// { 
SHAWI\J F. WILKE~SON 
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender 
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